Abstract: Evangelical Christians are a rapidly growing share of the population in most Latin American countries, yet their involvement and success in electoral politics varies widely, even among the countries where they are most numerous. This paper examines the cases of Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, and Peru, assessing a series of potential explanations for cross-national variation in evangelicals’ electoral achievements. These include the class structure of the evangelical community; legislative incentives (particularly constitution writing) that could spur political involvement; the implications of electoral and party system for ballot access; the strategy and tactics of the movement, particular with respect to cooperation vs. competition among churches; and the potential negative weight of evangelicals’ involvement in corruption or ties to prior authoritarian regimes. I leverage electoral results, survey data, and evidence drawn from secondary literature in order to assess the contribution of each factor to evangelicals’ political success or failure.
In the mid-1980s, Brazilian evangelical churches abandoned their traditional posture of “believers don’t mess with politics” for a new stance, “brother votes for brother,” that sought active involvement in elections and public life. In 1986, 33 Protestants (generally referred to as evangélicos, regardless of denomination) gained seats in Congress. By 2010, the Evangelical Caucus had grown to 71 members, or 12% of Congress as a whole. Evangelical politicians have been elected governor of major states such as Rio de Janeiro and finished third in the presidential elections of 2002 and 2010, substantially affecting the dynamics of the latter race. Certain Brazilian churches, particularly the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, have developed explicit electoral strategies, drawing up official lists of candidates for each office. Pastors and bishops themselves frequently run for office, often listing their religious title on the ballot and emphasizing their status as clergy during the campaign (Boas 2013).

The electoral accomplishments of evangelical Christians in Brazil contrast with those in other Latin American countries where they are a sizeable share of the population. In Chile, a case often compared to Brazil (Willems 1967; Patterson 2005b), no evangelical has run for president or been elected to Congress, and an effort to establish an evangelical party in the late 1990s ultimately fizzled. In Peru, evangelicals Christians formed the grassroots support base for Alberto Fujimori’s 1990 presidential campaign, 52 ran for Congress, and 20 were elected. Since then, however, ambitions have far outstripped achievements: there were 251 evangelical candidacies over the next five congressional elections but only 23 victories. Guatemala, Latin America’s most heavily evangelical country, is also something of a mixed case. Evangelical Christians were elected to the presidency and 22 seats in Congress in 1990, but they have been much less successful in subsequent elections. Yet 2011 marks a possible comeback, with an evangelical candidate garnering 47% of the vote in the first round of the presidential election.
Evangelical Christianity is a rapidly growing phenomenon in Latin America, challenging the hegemony of the historically dominant Catholic Church as well as a rising tide of secularism. With increasing religious pluralism has come increasingly heated politics. Catholic-Protestant competition for believers has spilled over into competition at the ballot box. Moral issues like abortion and same-sex marriage are fought out in the electoral arena in a way that seemed unthinkable a decade ago. In a number of countries, evangelical Christians are leading the political charge in these battles; elsewhere they have largely remained on the sidelines.

What explains the substantial variation across Latin America in terms of evangelical Christians’ involvement and success with electoral politics? Political scientists have had little to say about this question. While there is a substantial literature on Protestantism in Latin America, most contributions have come from other disciplines (Bastian 1995; Berg & Pretiz 1996; Chesnut 2003, 2009; Cleary and Stewart-Gambino 1997; Escobar 2011; Freston 2004, 2008; Garrard-Burnett 2009; Garrard-Burnett and Stoll 1993; Ireland 1991; Martin 1993). Single case studies predominate; comparative work has mostly taken the form of edited volumes. To my knowledge, only an unpublished doctoral dissertation has used systematic, cross-national comparisons to explain variation in the electoral ambitions of this faith community (Mora Torres 2010, 2013). The opinions and voting behavior of Latin American evangelicals have attracted somewhat greater attention from political scientists (Aguilar et al. 2003; Boas 2013; Boas and Smith 2013; Bohn 2004, 2007; Camp 2008; Patterson 2004a, 2005a, 2005b; Smith 2013; Smilde 2004; Steigenga 2003; Valenzuela, Scully, and Somma 2007; Zub 2002), though cross-national comparative work is still limited. The paucity of political science research on evangelicals in Latin America stands in contrast to the much more extensive literature on the political role of the Roman Catholic Church (Bruneau 1982; Camp 1997; Chesnut 1997, 2003; Daudelin & Hewitt
1995; Fleet and Smith 1997; Gill 1998; Hagopian 2008, 2009; Johnston and Figa 1998; Klaiber 1998; Mainwaring 1986; Mainwaring and Scully 2003), as well as other new movements, such as indigenous groups, that have recently sought to enter electoral and party politics (Madrid 2012; Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005).

This paper constitutes a preliminary effort to explain why evangelical Christians have been more electorally successful in some Latin American countries than in others. I focus on the three South American countries (Brazil, Chile, and Peru) and the Central American country (Guatemala) where this religious minority is largest.¹ I explore five existing categories of explanations present in the literature on evangelicals and politics in Latin America: those focusing on the class structure of the evangelical community; legislative incentives (especially constitution writing) that might motivate its engagement with electoral politics; the influence of party and electoral systems, particular with respect to ballot access; the strategy and tactics of the movement in each country, especially with regard to interdenominational cooperation or competition; and negative historical associations—e.g., with former dictators or instances of corruption—that might limit evangelicals’ ability to appeal beyond their natural voting base. Where possible, I draw upon electoral and survey data from each country (the latter in the form of the 2012 AmericasBarometer) to evaluate these explanations. On the whole, the paper serves primarily as a roadmap to orient future, more in-depth research on this question.

¹ According to the 2012 AmericasBarometer, evangelical and Pentecostal Christians are 34% of the population in Guatemala, 13% in Chile, 11% in Peru, and 10% in Brazil. When mainline/historical Protestants (Methodists, Presbyterians, and the like) are included, the figures are 37% in Guatemala, 16% in Chile, 14% in Peru, and 25% in Brazil. On the latter metric, Colombia and Bolivia are slightly ahead of Peru, and Nicaragua and El Salvador are slightly ahead of Guatemala.
Class Structure

A first potential explanation for cross-national differences in the electoral success of evangelical Christians concerns the class structure of this religious minority. Throughout Latin America, Protestantism has been particularly attractive among lower-class communities, and on average, evangelicals are typically less wealthy than Catholics. However, the class structure of this religious minority differs cross-nationally; evangelicals are overwhelmingly lower-class in some countries and more on par with Catholics in others. Social class matters in numerous ways for success with electoral politics. A better educated religious community is more likely to produce leaders who have the volition to enter electoral politics and who stand a chance of succeeding. Higher average incomes mean more lucrative sources of campaign donations and other financial resources for incipient political movements. Discrimination may also hinder the political ambitions of communities that are perceived as lower-class, even when individual leaders are wealthier or better educated.

Existing explanations for evangelicals’ success or failure in electoral politics have sometimes focused on social class. In Chile, evangelicalism was traditionally seen as providing an apolitical haven or refuge from the difficulties of everyday life, with ties between pastors and the faithful reproducing the relationship between peasants and landlord on a rural estate (Lalive D’Epinay 1969). Pentecostalism, the dominant form of evangelicalism in Chile, is attractive to lower-class communities because of its emphasis on oral tradition, which makes it more accessible to illiterates, and its informal route to becoming a pastor, which relies on street preaching rather than seminary training (Cleary and Sepúlveda 1997). Both census and survey data have shown the movement to be of humble origins; in a 2007-2008 survey of evangelicals,
97% were from the middle or lower income categories (Fediakova and Parker 2009). In particular, scholars have pointed to Chile’s rigid social structure as a barrier to the electoral success of this primarily lower-class movement. In contrast, Guatemalan evangelicals have often been characterized as comparatively wealthy and well educated, which has helped their electoral prospects (Freston 2004).

For a comparative perspective on the class structure of evangelicalism in different countries, we can turn to recent survey data. Table 1 compares the median household income of evangelicals and Catholics in Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, and Peru, based on the 2012 wave of the AmericasBarometer. These data suggest that, while class structure might not be the best explanation for Chilean evangelicals’ relative absence from electoral politics, it might help to explain Brazilian evangelicals’ success. In Guatemala, Chile, and Peru, the median income of evangelicals is about three-quarters that of Catholics; in Brazil, the two groups are comparable in terms of wealth. On the basis of social class alone, Brazilian evangelicals seem less likely to suffer discrimination than those in the other three countries. The income distribution for evangelicals in each country, shown in Figure 1, suggests an additional advantage for Brazilians: a disproportionately large share occupies the highest income category. These comparatively wealthy Brazilian evangelicals are a likely source of well-educated political candidates and generous campaign donations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Catholics</th>
<th>Evangelicals</th>
<th>Evangelical/Catholic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>$675-760</td>
<td>$675-760</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>$185-230</td>
<td>$140-185</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>$560-655</td>
<td>$440-500</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>$295-335</td>
<td>$210-250</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP.
Figure 1: Evangelical Income Distribution

Legislative Incentives

Structural variables like income and social class may account for differences in political skills and resources, but they say nothing about incentives for political involvement in the first place. Because of their emphasis on the afterlife rather than worldly pursuits, evangelicals typically have a natural disinclination to participate in politics. A first necessary step for a politically successful movement, therefore, is an incentive to enter the electoral arena. In Latin America, with its long history of formal and informal ties between the state and the Catholic Church, the primarily motivation for evangelicals’ political involvement has been the defense of religious liberty and separation of church and state.

In particular, constitution-writing moments have provided an initial incentive for evangelicals’ electoral mobilization. Brazil has had several democratic elections for constituent assemblies, and each has spurred participation by evangelicals. The lead-up to the 1933 constituent assembly election saw the formation of a new evangelical political party, the São Paulo Evangelical Civic Union (*União Cívica Evangélica Paulista*), which sponsored a pastor
running for deputy (Campos 2005). Churches organized voter registration drives, and pastors urged the faithful to vote. One open letter to Brazilian evangelicals expresses the motivation quite clearly:

Let’s abandon, once and for all, the attitude of mere observers, of hoping, of apparent well-being, of indifference and comfort… We urge that the voice of evangelicals in all Brazil be heard by those who will make up the Constituent Assembly, who will decide on the problems that affect spiritual and social life… Do not by any means vote for candidates or parties who support measures that compromise the secular nature of the State, introduce or permit religious instruction in public schools (Campos 2005: 39).

The 1945 legislative elections, in which voters choose representatives for the 1946 constituent assembly, saw a similar burst of evangelical campaigning and a handful of candidacies (Campos 2005).

Brazil’s biggest burst in evangelical electoral success came with the 1986 constituent assembly elections, in which 33 evangelicals won seats. The Assemblies of God, whose traditional stance had been that “believers don’t mess with politics” (crente não se mete em política), shifted its position for this election, publishing the book Irmão Vota em Irmão (Brother Votes for Brother) that laid out an explicit rationale for its members’ participation (Freston 2004). The church, which was the only one to endorse specific candidates in this election, ended up with 14 of its members in the constituent assembly, nearly double the size of the next largest church contingent (Burity 2005; Freston 1993; Pierucci 1996). Evangelical representatives took a particularly instrumental approach to the constituent assembly’s deliberations; while they stood clearly in favor of secularism and against any special privileges for the Catholic Church, they
were willing to trade votes on other issues for benefits such as media concessions (Freston 1993; Fonseca 2008).

On a much smaller scale, Peru’s 1978 constituent assembly election also spurred evangelicals’ electoral participation. APRA, traditionally the favored party of Peruvian evangelicals, sought a representative of this community for its party list in 1978. It eventually settled on Pedro Arana, an evangelical pastor who was not a party member but had longtime aprista sympathies. Peru differs from Brazil in that evangelical participation in this election was invited by a mainstream party and did not arise from independent initiative. However, Arana’s electoral success and experience as a legislator was similar. Following a campaign in which he sought to reach out to fellow evangelicals, he finished fourth out of 100 APRA candidates, ahead of historical party leaders such as Andrés Townsend (Arana 1987; Julcarima 2008). He saw his mandate as representing the interests of the evangelical community, and he spoke up only three times in the constituent assembly, twice with respect to church-state relations (Arana 1987).

Peru’s 1978 constituent assembly election is analogous to Brazil’s 1933 or 1945 elections in that it prompted an initial, albeit limited, involvement of evangelical candidates. Overall, constitution-writing has been less of an incentive for evangelical politicization in Peru. The major surge in evangelicals’ political involvement came in the 1990 election, long after the constitutional question of church-state separation had been settled. The 1993 constituent assembly election took place under Fujimori’s semi-authoritarian regime, after a falling out between the president and the evangelical community; few evangelicals participated or were elected. Subsequent constitutional changes have come through amendment rather than rewriting.

Constitution writing provided much less of an incentive for evangelical politicization in Chile. Chile has had no constituent assembly elections during the period in which evangelicals
might be poised to participate. Church and state were officially separated in the 1925 constitution, written by a committee appointed by president Arturo Alessandri Palma and approved by referendum. The 1980 constitution was similarly written by an appointed committee (designated by Pinochet’s military government) and approved by referendum; subsequent changes have come through amendments.

Constitution writing also appears not to have played much of a role in the politicization of Guatemala’s evangelical Christians. Constituent assembly elections were held in both 1954 and 1964, though these predate evangelicals’ electoral ambitions. Rather than being motivated to defend their religious interests in a democratic election, evangelicals’ entrée into electoral politics sought to take advantage of circumstances presented by the authoritarian regime of General Efraín Ríos Montt, an outspoken evangelical who appointed several members of his church as special advisors. Following Ríos Montt’s dictatorship and the return to a civilian regime in the mid-1980s, evangelicals began running for office at all level, including president. According to Ortiz (2004), Guatemalan evangelical politicians have mostly sought to take advantage of circumstances that presented themselves; they have lacked the sort of clear political project that might be provided by a constitution-writing moment. Yet a constituent assembly election was held in 1984 as part of the transition from authoritarian rule. More research is necessary to determine why this election, or those of 1954 and 1964, did not spur more organized, principled participation by evangelicals.

Other legislative incentives besides constitution writing can encourage evangelicals to get involved in electoral politics. In Chile, evangelicals mobilized in the 1990s in support of a freedom of religion law that was passed in 1999 (Fediakova 2002). Yet for everyday legislative battles such as these, evangelicals are just as likely to seek influence as outside pressure groups.
(as they did in Chile). For elections to a constituent assembly, where issues of church-state relations are often explicitly hashed out, evangelicals are more likely to attempt putting members of their own community in office.

**Electoral and Party Systems**

Financial resources, education, and the incentive to participate directly in legislative battles such as constitution-writing may matter for little if evangelicals cannot get access to the ballot or affiliate with a party that stands a chance of putting them in office. Electoral systems matter for minorities’ chances of winning office, as the literature on indigenous political parties in Latin America has made clear (Van Cott 2005). In contrast to indigenous groups, which are often concentrated geographically and may benefit from single member district systems, evangelical Christians tend to be distributed throughout the country, not (yet) constituting a plurality in any one region. Proportional representation is thus more likely to help them win office. In particular, open list PR with high district magnitude has been identified as an electoral system that is particularly favorable to evangelicals’ electoral prospects (Freston 2008).

Open list PR with high district magnitude facilitates evangelicals’ access to the ballot by giving party leaders incentives to diversify their lists and numerous slots to offer candidates from different social groups. If identity voting outweighs party voting for evangelicals, putting a representative of their community on the list is likely to bring additional votes—and potentially seats—for the party or coalition. Diversifying the list (in a single national district election with $M=100$) was APRA’s explicit motivation for inviting Pedro Arana run for office in Peru’s 1978 election, despite his not being a party member (Arana 1987). In Brazil, the lower legislative
chamber—elected via open list PR, with district magnitude as high as 70 for the state of São Paulo—is thought to be particularly favorable for evangelicals’ ballot access. Chile’s lower chamber is also filled via open list PR, but it has only 2 representatives per district (the binomial system), which has been considered a barrier to evangelicals getting on the ballot (Freston 2004; Fediakova and Parker 2006).

Comparisons between municipal and national legislatures in Brazil, Chile, and Peru provide some evidence of the role of electoral systems in evangelicals’ ballot access (Table 2). I focus on the rate of ballot access for evangelical pastors, who can be readily identified (at least in Brazil and Peru) based on candidates’ occupational self-declarations. In Brazil, open list PR is used for legislative elections at all levels (except the Senate). Average district magnitude is higher for the federal Chamber of Deputies (19) than for municipal councils (10.3), but comparatively high in both cases; moreover, coalitions are allowed to present twice as many candidates as there are seats. Pastors find their way on to party lists at both levels, though they are 3.5 times more prevalent among candidates for federal deputy—possibly because of the larger district magnitude, and possibly because evangelicals have strategically targeted higher level offices. In Peru, the unicameral Congress is elected via open list PR with moderate district magnitudes (average 5.2), but elections for municipal councils are closed list, which should offer more of a barrier to ballot access. Here, pastors are 7.9 times as prevalent among candidates for the higher office. Finally, Chile uses open list PR for both the national and municipal levels, but with an average district magnitude of 6.4 for the latter and only 2 for the former. Comprehensive candidate occupation data are not available, but scholars have not identified any evangelical pastors running for Congress in Chile. Meanwhile, a handful of pastors have found their way
onto municipal party lists, according to data published by Chile’s National Council of Evangelical Churches (CONIEV 2012).

Table 2: Ballot Access for Evangelical Pastors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>PR Form</th>
<th>Avg. Dist. Mag.</th>
<th>Pastors</th>
<th>National Rate / Municipal Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Open List</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0.582%</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Municipal</td>
<td>Open List</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>0.164%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Open List</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>0.462%</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Municipal</td>
<td>Closed List</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.058%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Open List</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Municipal</td>
<td>Open List</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>0.091%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Open list PR with high district magnitudes not only helps evangelicals gain access to the ballot; it can also help them win seats. Open list PR pits candidates against their list-mates as well as those from opposing coalitions, so successful campaigning requires cultivating an independent appeal, apart from party label. Status as a religious minority—and for pastors, religious leadership—provides just such an appeal. In his memoir, Arana (1987) credits the open list system with facilitating his unexpectedly strong performance in Peru’s 1978 election, and he suggests that evangelicals would have done better in the 1980 election if it had been retained.\(^2\) Candidates who win election under open list PR because of their independent appeal are in a strong position to win again in future elections, even under a different party label.

Yet if open list PR allows strong candidates to climb to the top of the list based on their ability to garner personal votes, it also allows weaker candidates to gain office on the coattails of the strongest members of the list. Seats are awarded to parties or coalitions based on total votes for all candidates on the list (or a vote cast for the party or coalition without specifying a

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\(^2\) Open list PR was reinstated for the 1985 congressional election and has been used ever since.
candidate), and then to candidates according to their rank within the list. In some parties or coalitions, one or a few strong candidates may contribute a large portion of list votes, winning seats for other list members with a much weaker performance. Thus, in any open list PR system, some candidates are elected with lower personal vote totals than losing candidates from other coalitions. Evangelical candidates who lack campaign experience or an independent appeal might nonetheless be swept into office on the strength of other list members, or of their party label. This route to electoral success is more precarious. A falling out between elected legislators and party leaders might bar access to the same coalition’s list in future elections, or the loss of a strong, non-evangelical candidate might weaken the coalition’s performance as a whole. In either case, evangelical candidates might lose future reelection bids.

A coattails effect is likely to explain evangelical candidates’ unusually strong performance in Peru’s 1990 election and relatively poor results thereafter. Evangelical pastors formed a key component of the grassroots base for the new Cambio ‘90 party that Alberto Fujimori constructed in the lead-up to the 1990 election; they played a key role in collecting signatures to register the party (Gutiérrez Sánchez 2000). In recognition of this effort, evangelicals were given one of Cambio ‘90’s two vice presidential slots and about a fifth of candidate positions for each house of Congress (Julcarima 2008). A total of 54 evangelical candidates competed in this election, all but two of them on Cambio ‘90’s lists. Yet most of Cambio ‘90’s evangelical candidates were politically inexperienced, as they themselves later acknowledged (López 2004). They were unlikely to have either a large preexisting base of supporters or the skills to build such a base during the campaign. Given the phenomenal nature of Fujimori’s last-minute surge in the presidential race, he generated strong coattails for legislative candidates. Only 35% percent votes for Cambio ‘90 in the lower house election were
cast for specific candidates; most voters simply voted for the party list. Yet after the election, and especially after his 1992 *autogolpe* (unilaterally shutting down the Congress), most of Cambio ‘90’s evangelicals broke ranks with Fujimori. In future elections, they would not be able to enjoy the coattails that accrued to members of the *fujimorista* list, nor had they developed strong independent bases of support that would facilitate their success with other coalitions.

Analysis of the vote share of victorious evangelical candidates in Peru’s 1990 election underscores the precarious nature of their success, especially compared to their Brazilian counterparts. For each winning candidate, I calculated their rank, by number of personal votes, among all elected legislators in the corresponding district. Those ranked near the bottom are more likely to have gained office only because of votes for the party or a popular listmate, not because of their electoral prowess. While the median winner in Peru’s 1990 election ranked fifth out of nine victorious candidates, or 44th percentile, in his or her district, the median evangelical winner was only in the 20th percentile. By contrast, the median evangelical candidate in Brazil’s 1986 election ranked in the 46th percentile, versus the 48th for all winners. In the first big electoral victory for Brazilian evangelicals, therefore, successful candidates had more independent appeal than did Peruvian evangelicals in their own “breakout” election.

Differences in the electoral strength of victorious candidates likely reflect differences in evangelicals’ approach to each election. As noted above, Brazilian evangelicals specifically targeted the 1986 Constituent Assembly election in an effort to wield influence in the writing of a new constitution. The Assemblies of God went so far as to endorse specific candidates. Candidates were spread across several parties rather than being concentrated in one. By contrast, Peru’s evangelicals essentially jumped on the Cambio ‘90 bandwagon, without the same

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3 The corresponding figures for FREDEMO and APRA, which finished ahead of Cambio ‘90 in the legislative race, were 75% and 61%, respectively.
strategic approach to the election. Their legislative victories in this election are due more to the Fujimori phenomenon than to their individual effort.

Apart from the influence of electoral systems, party systems also matter for evangelicals’ electoral prospects. Fragmented party systems imply numerous legislative lists in each election and more opportunities to get on the ballot. Candidates who develop an independent appeal and electoral support base may be able to change parties with the political winds and still win reelection, but only if there are other viable alternatives in the party system and few barriers to party switching. Aside from the goal of winning office, electing candidates in multiple parties may help evangelicals, or particular churches, spread their bets around and retain legislative influence regardless of who is in power.

Brazil’s fragmented party system has been highly favorable to evangelical candidates. In the 1986 election, evangelical deputies were elected from 7 parties, though over two-thirds ran with the centrist PMDB or right-wing PFL. The effective number of parties among the evangelical caucus chosen in this election was 3.4. By the 2000s, the evangelical caucus was even more diverse: 11 parties and 8.7 effective parties from 2003-2006, 12 parties and 8.2 effective parties from 2007-2010, 14 parties and 9.4 effective parties from 2011-2014. Party switching is also particularly rampant among evangelical legislators, who generally have institutional loyalty to their churches and treat party affiliation in a purely instrumental fashion (Freston 2004). Of the 11 evangelical deputies elected from the state of Rio de Janeiro in 2002, only one had been with a single party for his entire career; another had changed parties five times in two years, the most of any deputy in that legislature (Machado 2006: 155).

Chile’s more institutionalized party system has been considered much less hospitable to evangelical candidates (Freston 2004). There are many fewer parties in Chile than in Brazil, and
major parties are grouped into two blocs, the center-left Concertación and the center-right Alianza por Chile. Third parties and independents form their own lists to run for Congress, though they tend to fare poorly. However, evidence from Chile’s 2012 municipal elections suggests that electoral system incentives may matter more than the party system for evangelicals’ ballot access. While the composition candidate lists at the national level are the object of intense horse trading among parties in each coalition, the greater number of positions on municipal lists leaves room to invite independents. In 2012, only 37% of evangelical candidates for city council were affiliated with mainstream parties; the largest share (44%) were independents. However, about half of these independents found their way onto the lists of either the Concertación or Alianza for Chile (denominated Coalición por el Cambio in this election). With larger district magnitude at the national level, Chile’s mainstream parties might well respond to electoral incentives and invite evangelicals onto their coalition lists in an effort to capture the votes of this segment of the electorate.

Peru’s party system is similar to Brazil’s in terms of its level of fragmentation, which has allowed evangelicals to find their way on the lists of numerous parties. While evangelical candidates ran almost exclusively with Cambio ‘90 in 1990, and were evenly split among 2 lists in the 1992 constituent assembly elections, they have run on 9–12 different lists in every subsequent legislative election. The effective number of parties declined in 2006 as these candidates flocked to two new evangelical parties, Restauración Nacional and Reconstrucción Democrática (Rivera 2006). Still, it is clear that the country’s party and electoral system have not presented serious barriers to ballot access for Peru’s evangelicals.

The combination of open list PR, high district magnitude, and fluid party systems may be particularly favorable for evangelicals’ ballot access, yet it also carries the risk that they will
spread themselves too thin. A smaller number of candidates on a smaller number of lists might actually be favorable for evangelicals’ electoral prospects by concentrating the vote and allowing more of them to win office. Peruvian evangelicals’ strongest electoral performance came in 1990, when nearly all candidates ran on the Cambio ‘90 list. As argued above, that success may have been illusory and at least partially dependent on Fujimori’s coattails. However, candidates might have met with greater success in subsequent elections by running with fewer parties, especially given the smaller evangelical population in Peru.

As the Peruvian example suggests, fluid party systems might also facilitate the entry of new parties specifically oriented toward evangelicals, which could facilitate both ballot access and electoral success. The dramatic spike in the number of evangelical candidates in Peru’s 2006 election is directly attributable to Restauración Nacional and Reconstrucción Democrática, which ran 62 and 30 evangelical candidates, respectively. Mora Torres (2013) argues that evangelicals’ political strategy in a given country will be largely determined by its party system. In countries with inchoate party systems and low barriers to entry, including Peru, evangelicals will create their own parties; with numerous established parties, as in Brazil, they will make deals with party leaders to run on other labels; and where there is a small number of established parties (a category in which we might place Chile), they will organize instead as pressure groups.

Peru’s fluid party system has certainly seen the most attempts to form evangelical parties. Scholars have identified two movements that registered or attempted to register as political parties in the 1980s, and as many as 10 failed efforts at party formation in the 1990s (López 2004; Gutiérrez 2008; Julcarima 2008). None of these groups presented their own candidates in any election; many did not obtain sufficient signatures to get on the ballot, though they were able to negotiate with other parties or coalitions and contribute candidates to their lists. Not until
2006, with the registration of Restauración Nacional and Reconstrucción Democrática, were evangelical parties able to successfully register and present candidates for office.

Yet evangelicals’ party-building efforts do not help to explain cross-national differences in their success with electoral politics. In Brazil, Chile, and Peru, evangelicals first won election on the lists of nonconfessional parties, and most evangelical legislators have taken this route to office. Successful party building came later, and it has contributed less, if at all, to the ranks of elected officials. In Peru, nearly all evangelicals who gained office from 1990-2000 ran with fujimorista parties; since then, they have been successful on several different lists. However, only 2 of Restauración Nacional’s 62 evangelical candidates, and none of Reconstrucción Democrática’s, were elected to Congress in 2006; neither group ran its own list in the 2011 election. In Brazil, the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (IURD) partially took over the Partido Liberal (PL) in 1999, and it created the Partido Republicano Brasileiro (PRB) in 2005. Over time, the IURD’s elected deputies have been more concentrated in its affiliated parties—8 of 18 in 2002, 1 of 4 in 2006, 5 of 5 in 2011. However, it achieved substantial electoral success prior to adopting a “single party” strategy, as have other churches that never attempted to create their own parties. In Chile evangelicals organized a new party relatively soon after democratization—the Alianza Nacional Cristiana, established in 1995. Yet this organization was short-lived, and its only elected legislators, 4 city council members in 1996, gained office thanks to an electoral alliance with Renovación Nacional, a mainstream party. When going it alone—supporting an independent congressional candidate who received 3% of the vote in 1997, or backing the independent presidential bid of Salvador Pino Bustos, who ultimately failed to garner enough signatures to get on the ballot—this evangelical party was unsuccessful (Fediakova 2004).
In sum, looking across the cases of Brazil, Chile, and Peru, electoral system factors seem to matter the most for evangelicals’ electoral fortunes, with party systems playing a secondary role. While all three countries use open list PR, they vary in terms of district magnitude. In Chile, where low district magnitude makes congressional candidacies a scarce commodity, few evangelicals have even gotten on the ballot. They have been more successful at doing so in municipal elections, where there are many more list positions to go around. In Brazil and Peru—particularly the former—higher district magnitude has meant longer lists and more opportunities to run for office. Fluid party systems in these countries have also given evangelicals many parties to choose from in seeking candidacies. However, the more institutionalized party system in Chile seems not to have prevented evangelicals’ access to the ballot in municipal elections. Finally, the ease with which evangelicals have been able to form their own parties does not seem to matter much for their electoral success in any of these countries.

Open list PR with high district magnitude also presents risks and limitations. Candidates might win office largely on the coattails of other politicians and stand little chance in future elections without those same names at the top of the ballot. With multiple opportunities for ballot access, evangelical candidates might also spread themselves too thin, splitting the religious vote and preventing anyone from getting elected. Whether evangelicals can overcome these limitations will depend largely on strategy and tactics—the extent to which candidates are capable of crafting an independent appeal and building their own base of supporters, as well as the degree to which different churches or factions of the evangelical movement can coordinate with one another.
In their efforts to pursue common political interests, particularly those that come into conflict with the Catholic Church, evangelicals face inherent challenges. While the Catholic Church is organized in a single hierarchy with an official set of positions on many political and social issues, evangelical churches are divided by theology, political priorities, and rivalries. At times, especially when they seek to elect representatives to constituent assemblies to defend the separation of church and state, evangelicals have been able to act in pursuit of common interests. In many other instances, they have competed with one another in addition to the Catholic Church. Internal competition might stimulate different evangelical churches to each work harder at electing their representatives, advancing the political representation of the movement as a whole. Yet it might also spread the evangelical vote too thin, with negative consequences. There are also substantial cross-national differences in the political savvy of the evangelical movement. In some countries, engaging with electoral politics has simply meant encouraging evangelicals to vote and run for office; elsewhere, particularly in Brazil, it has meant a much more concerted—even Machiavellian—electoral strategy.

Brazil stands out as a case of a politically savvy evangelical community, and one where competition among churches seems to have helped the movement as a whole. Several Brazilian churches endorse specific candidates in an effort to maximize the vote. As noted above, the Assemblies of God was the first to do this, in the 1986 constituent assembly election, and was rewarded with the largest share of evangelical deputies (Freston 1993; Burity 2005).

More recently, the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (IURD) has set the standard in terms of a strategic approach to electoral politics. The IURD takes a census of church
members prior to each election and transmits these data to the national leadership, which identifies specific church-affiliated candidates to run in each district. It provides institutional support for their campaigns, via sermons and church-owned media, and it carefully instructs church members on how to vote, especially in instances where more than one IURD-affiliated candidate is on the list (Machado 2005; Oro 2005). The IURD even planned church locations in Rio de Janeiro in an effort to maximize its chances of electing federal deputies (Freston 1993).

IURD has also made a push to place its own clergy in candidate positions; such elected officials are most likely to retain institutional loyalty to the church (Machado 2006). IURD’s efforts are reflected in its members’ extremely high levels of politicization and discipline. In a survey of Rio de Janeiro evangelicals, IURD members were the most involved in elections by several metrics (praying for a candidate, participating in church discussions about elections, and putting up campaign posters at home), most likely to say they would vote for a candidate from their church, and least likely to vote for those from other churches (Fernandes et al. 1998).

The IURD clearly competes rather than cooperates with other evangelical churches in Brazil. In several elections—for São Paulo governor in 1994, Rio de Janeiro governor in 1994 and 1998, and president in 2002—it endorsed a non-evangelical over an evangelical candidate from another church (Fonseca 1998; Freston 2004). Such decisions privileged pragmatic alliances—e.g., with Lula in 2002, who was much more likely to win the presidency than the evangelical candidate Garotinho—over religious solidarity. Yet competition with the IURD has also helped other churches’ electoral performance by encouraging them to adopt some of the IURD’s successful tactics, instructing church members on how to vote or systematically assessing their electoral prospects in each district before deciding whether to run candidates (Campos 2005, Machado 2005, Oro 2005).
Peruvian evangelicals have been more unified than those in Brazil, though with less obvious political savvy. Both countries have two competing representative organizations for evangelicals, the Evangelical Association and National Council of Pastors of Brazil in the former and the National Confederation of Evangelical Pastors (CONEP) and International Fraternity of Christian Pastors (FIPAC) in the latter. However, Peru’s CONEP is most dominant, representing 85% of churches (Freston 2004; López 2008). Evangelical unity in Peru may have facilitated the formation of pan-evangelical parties such as Restauración Nacional (despite the fact that its leader, Humberto Lay, was head of the rival organization FIPAC). However, there is no evidence of Peruvian evangelicals (either jointly or via individual churches) strategically planning how many candidates to place on mainstream party lists in each district, or instructing church members to vote for these candidates. Without efforts of this sort, evangelical leaders may have been unable to prevent the proliferation of candidacies beyond what is viable, with too many competing politicians splitting the votes of Peru’s comparatively small evangelical population (López 2008).

A separate but related issue of strategy concerns the question of narrow versus broad appeals: do evangelical politicians seek votes only from their own community, or do they reach out more broadly, campaigning on non-religious themes? Different appeals may be appropriate for different offices, since legislators can be elected with a small vote share under open list PR, but those running for executive office (or senate in Brazil) need a plurality to win. In Brazil, a number of evangelicals who have been successful in single member district elections, including Rio de Janeiro governors Anthony Garotinho and Benedita da Silva and Rio de Janeiro senator Marcelo Crivella, have either downplayed religion in their campaigns or sought to balance a generic message directed at voters in general with a more specific, religious one oriented toward
evangelicals (Fonseca 2008; Machado 2005, 2006). Following the success of Crivella’s campaign, the IURD began to recommend that candidates in single member district elections not use church titles, such as “pastor” or “bishop,” in their official campaign names (Machado 2005). In PR elections, however, candidates (at least in Rio de Janeiro) have continued to campaign primarily on their religious identity and, where relevant, to emphasize their church leadership positions (Machado 2005).

In Peru, evangelicals have primarily oriented their campaigns toward other evangelicals, a tactic that some consider to have limited their electoral success (López 2004). Yet, until recently, their candidacies had been limited to open list PR legislative elections, where such tactics make more sense. The campaign appeals of Humberto Lay, an pastor who ran for president in 2006, Lima mayor in 2006 and 2010, and Congress in 2011, merit more attention in this respect. Was Lay finally successful in the congressional race, but not in his prior attempts at executive office, because his campaign appeals were too narrowly targeted?

Less is known about the political strategy and tactics of the evangelical community in Guatemala and Chile. Fediakova (2004) has suggested that Chilean evangelicals’ are too divided to be as politically successful as their Brazilian counterparts, though clearly the Brazilian success has come primarily through the efforts of individual churches. In Guatemala, the evangelical community may have been overly reliant—at least until recently—on the leadership of former dictator Efraín Ríos Montt, limiting its ability to draw support beyond a hard core support base. Manuel Baldizón’s strong showing in the 2011 presidential election—winning 47% of the vote in the first round, and qualifying for the runoff—may be indicative of a new generation of evangelical politicians who can move beyond Ríos Montt’s controversial past.
A final issue related to strategy and tactics that merits further attention is the evangelical community’s use of the media. Brazilian evangelicals, particularly the IURD, have acquired a substantial media empire; the IURD-owned Rede Record is Brazil’s second largest broadcast television network (Birman and Lehmann 1999; Fonseca 2003; Santos & Capparelli 2004; Reis 2006). Media control has undoubtedly contributed to Brazilian evangelicals’ electoral successes. In Chile, Guatemala, and Peru, evangelicals have been less successful in their efforts to gain access to the mass media (e.g., Smith and Campos 2005), though the details still need to be explored.

Negative Historical Associations

Throughout Latin America, those evangelical Christians who make the case for engaging with electoral politics routinely argue that evangelicals have an obligation to bring morality to an area of public life where it is severely lacking. Yet, in their quest for power and privileges, they have often fallen victim to the very vices they criticize, engaging in corruption or supporting the abuse of human rights. In Chile, Guatemala, and Peru, prominent evangelicals have ties to brutal dictators who were in power during the 1970s–1990s. In Brazil, evangelical elected officials have been implicated in major corruption schemes during the 1990s and 2000s. Negative associations of this sort might not dissuade evangelical voters from casting a ballot for a fellow believer, but it could limit these candidates’ abilities to reach beyond their natural support base and win the votes of those with other religious beliefs.

Evangelicals’ ties to the dirty side of politics are most notorious in Guatemala. Guatemala’s first evangelical president was Efraín Ríos Montt, who took power through a coup
in 1982 and went on to orchestrate a brutal scorched earth campaign against leftist guerrillas and their suspected sympathizers. Ríos Montt’s portrayed the counterinsurgency effort as a holy war, equating communism with the Antichrist and claiming that God was guiding his hand. Evangelicals benefited from his presidency; membership increased in rural areas because it was seen as protection against crackdowns, and evangelical groups were favored in the distribution of government aid in war-torn areas. Pastors often cooperated with the government, acting as leaders in civil patrols and taking up local authority positions, though many did so only because they were forced to choose between siding with the military or the guerrillas. A number of evangelical politicians, including future president Jorge Serrano, began their political careers during Ríos Montt’s government (Garrard-Burnett 1998).

Negative associations for Guatemala’s evangelicals continued after Ríos Montt’s presidency. Serrano, elected president in 1990, was forced to resign and went into exile in 1993 after attempting to suspend the constitution and shut down Congress and the Supreme Court. A number of evangelicals were slow to distance themselves from Serrano during his period (Ortiz 2004). For his part, Ríos Montt’s prominent place in Guatemalan politics continued long after his presidency. He sought to run for president in 1990, 1995, and 1999 but was blocked by a constitutional ban on candidacies by former coup leaders; he prevailed in 2003, thanks to a favorable court decision, and finished third in the presidential election. He also served multiple terms in Congress during the 1990s and 2000s, and was President of Congress from 2000-2004. Ríos Montt’s continued success in Guatemalan politics attests to a loyal support base.

Nonetheless, controversial figures like Ríos Montt or Serrano could also make it difficult for evangelical candidates to win votes beyond the community of fellow believers.
Evangelicals’ ties to former dictators are most prominent in Guatemala, but they are relevant also in Chile and Peru. In Chile, evangelical leaders forged ties with Pinochet soon after the 1973 coup and remained staunch supporters well into the 1980s. With the Catholic Church taking a critical stance toward the dictatorship, Pinochet sought religious legitimation from the evangelical community; for their part, evangelical leaders hoped to gain state support for objectives such as religious equality legislation (Cleary and Sepúlveda 1997; Lagos Schuffeneger 1991). This reciprocal relationship was formalized in a 1975 deal in which 2500 pastors and church members expressed unconditional support for the government and called the coup and act of God. In exchange, Pinochet attended the inauguration of the main cathedral of the Iglesia Metodista Pentecostal and went on to make annual appearances at the Evangelical Te Deum, a religious service that coincides with independence day celebrations (Lagos Schuffeneger 1998). Pro-Pinochet evangelical leaders organized themselves into the Consejo de Pastores, which claimed to speak for the entire evangelical community, and they pegged as communist anyone that disagreed with them. Nonetheless, dissident evangelical organizations, such as the Asociación de Iglesias Evangélicas de Chile and Confraternidad Cristiana de Iglesias, took a pro-human rights stance (Kamsteeg 1998; Lagos Schuffeneger 1991).

In Peru, similar opportunistic motivations led some prominent evangelical politicians to side with Fujimori even after his autogolpe and turn in an authoritarian direction. By all accounts, evangelicals were initially attracted to Cambio ‘90 because of its emphasis on morality. Some evangelical elected officials in Cambio ‘90, such as Vice President Carlos García, were sidelined soon after Fujimori took power; some others broke ranks after the 1992 autogolpe. But a core group of evangelicals politicians—and the only ones who were successfully elected or reelected after 1990—remained loyal to Fujimori, rubber stamping his
proposals and acting as apologists for the regime. Pastor Pedro Vilchez, Fujimori’s initial entrée into the evangelical community and one of Cambio ‘90’s key organizers, suggested instrumental motives for evangelicals’ loyalty, noting that Fujimori had provided more benefits for the community than any other president (López 2004, 2008; Gutiérrez 2008).

Brazil stands out among the four cases examined here in that evangelicals have no significant ties to a former authoritarian regime. Rather, the negative associations that have plagued Brazilian evangelical politicians are those that also apply much more broadly to the political class—corruption. After already acquiring a negative image during the 1988 constituent assembly, when many appeared to trade votes for media concessions, a number of evangelical politicians were implicated in the 1993 budget scandal (Freston 2004), where construction firms paid bribes to congressmen for public works contracts. More recently, prominent evangelical politicians were involved in a series of scandals from 2004–2006, including Anthony Garotinho, governor of Rio de Janeiro from 1998–2002, and Bishop Carlos Rodrigues, a federal deputy and the main political strategist of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God. Both were ultimately convicted of corruption and sentenced to prison. Corruption scandals in Brazil have affected prominent politicians from every government and major political party, so evangelical elected officials are unlikely to appear any more dishonest than their non-evangelical counterparts, though they certainly might seem more hypocritical.

To test whether evangelicals’ associations with prior authoritarian regimes limit their ability to appeal beyond their natural voting base, I estimate a series of models using the 2012 AmericasBarometer. The dependent variable is the question “to what extent do you trust the Evangelical/Protestant Church,” measured on a 1–7 scale. I examine whether levels of trust are higher among those who admit sympathies for authoritarian rule—a minority position in each
country. As a dichotomous measure of authoritarianism, I use whether the respondent agrees with the statement “under some circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one.” As a continuous measure, I use the extent to which the respondent agrees with the statement “democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government” (measured on a 1–7 scale and reversed so that higher numbers indicate more authoritarian attitudes). For each country and measure, I estimate a bivariate regression model and another controlling for income, age, gender, education, ideological self-placement, and levels of trust in the Catholic Church. I limit each country’s sample to non-Protestant respondents since I am interested in evangelicals’ ability to move beyond their natural voting base. If ties to authoritarian rule hurt evangelicals in Chile, Peru, and Guatemala, we would expect trust in the evangelical church to be systematically lower among non-evangelicals with pro-democratic attitudes. Such a relationship should be absent in Brazil, where no such ties exist.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Bivariate, Dichotomous</th>
<th>Bivariate, Continuous</th>
<th>Multivariate, Dichotomous</th>
<th>Multivariate, Continuous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>0.27</td>
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<td>-0.02</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.15</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
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<td>0.22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: OLS regression coefficients and estimated standard errors are for the measure of authoritarian attitudes described in the text. Multivariate models additionally control for income, age, gender, education, ideological self-placement, and levels of trust in the Catholic Church. Data are from the 2012 wave of the AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, non-Protestant respondents only.

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4 The AmericasBarometer has no question about tolerance for official corruption, so I cannot test the parallel hypothesis about Brazilian evangelicals’ negative associations using these data.
The results of these regressions, reported in Table 3, argue against the hypothesis that evangelicals’ ties to authoritarian rule limit their ability to appeal beyond their natural base. In only one country, Brazil, are authoritarian attitudes estimated to have a significant positive relationship with trust in evangelicals. The statistical significance disappears in the multivariate model, but regardless, Brazil is the country where we would least expect such a relationship given evangelicals’ lack of ties to the prior authoritarian regime.

Of course, there are many limitations to the present analysis. Trust in the evangelical church is different from intention to vote for an evangelical candidate. Questions measuring authoritarian attitudes may be excessively blunt instruments. There is no way to know whether respondents actually associate the present-day evangelical church with prior authoritarian leaders. And causal inference using observational data—especially drawn from a single-wave, cross-sectional survey—requires often heroic assumptions.

A better way to test hypotheses about the effect on voting behavior of negative associations for evangelicals would be to conduct online survey experiments prior to upcoming general elections (Chile in 2013, Brazil in 2014, Guatemala in 2015, and Peru in 2016). Early in the survey, a question would describe various political positions taken by evangelicals in that country, including such issues as opposition to abortion or gay marriage. In the treatment condition, evangelicals’ prior support for authoritarian rule (or involvement in corruption scandals) would also be mentioned. The question would then ask “to what extent do you agree with the political positions of the evangelical community?” A subsequent question in the survey would measure the outcome of interest: intention to vote for an evangelical candidate for congress, either real or hypothetical, with the candidate’s religion mentioned as part of a brief biographical sketch. The survey experiment would thus ensure that evangelicals’ negative
associations were primed for the treatment group but not for the control group. Separating the treatment and outcome of interest would make the purpose of the survey less obvious and better approximate the effect of background knowledge about evangelicals on the decision to vote for a specific candidate.

Apart from its effect on the vote intention of non-evangelicals, negative associations for the evangelical community might hurt its electoral ambitions in other ways. Several authors have suggested that experiences such as betrayal by Fujimori in Peru, or Serrano’s ignominious demise in Guatemala, turned evangelicals off of future participation in electoral politics (Gutiérrez 2008; Samson 2008). While one would not necessarily expect to see effects on evangelicals’ trust in their own churches, their intention to vote in upcoming elections might be reduced when reminded of these associations. Hence, one could test this hypothesis using the same survey experiments described above. Being turned off of political participation might also mean that evangelicals were less mobilized to run for office or organize political movements following traumatic experiences with electoral politics—something that could be ascertained through interviews with evangelical leaders.

**Conclusion**

This paper has sought to examine a variety of existing explanations for why evangelical Christians have been more engaged with and successful in electoral politics in some Latin American countries, and much less engaged and successful in others. Brazil presents a particularly favorable scenario for evangelicals’ political achievements with respect to each of the factors examined above. On the whole, Brazilian evangelicals are similar to Catholics in
terms of social class, and there is an unusually large number in the highest income category. Several democratic elections for constituent assemblies have helped spur evangelicals’ electoral participation. Open list PR with high district magnitude and a particularly fragmented party system have facilitated evangelicals’ ballot access and allowed them to succeed in legislative elections primarily by appealing to fellow believers. Particular churches like the IURD have been unusually strategic in their approach to electoral politics, and interdenominational competition has spurred other churches to adopt some of these same successful tactics. Finally, while Brazilian evangelical politicians have been tarnished by recent involvement in corruption scandals, they have no ties to former military regimes that might limit the movement’s ability to appeal beyond its natural base.

Chile, where evangelicals’ forays into electoral politics have been much less successful, lies at the other end of the spectrum with respect to most of these factors examined here. Chilean evangelicals are more lower-class than their Catholic counterparts. There have been no democratic elections for constituent assemblies that might motivate them to seek office. Low district magnitude at the national level—and, to a lesser extent, an institutionalized party system—present barriers to evangelicals’ ballot access. Less is known about the effectiveness of the movements political tactics, though existing research has criticized their inability to overcome divisions (Fediakova 2004). Finally, strong historical ties to the Pinochet regime may act as a drag on the movement’s electoral ambitions, limiting its ability to draw votes from beyond the ranks of fellow believers.

While Brazil and Chile may appear as over-determined cases of evangelicals’ political success or failure, Peru and Guatemala lie in between, both in terms of the outcome and factors that might influence it. Evangelicals are of lower social class than Catholics in both countries, as
they are in Chile. Elections to constituent assemblies have taken place in both countries, though they may have come at inopportune times for evangelical politicization—either under authoritarian rule (Peru in 1978 and 1992) or after the ouster of an evangelical dictator (Guatemala 1984). Guatemala’s electoral system is closed list PR, which is less favorable to evangelicals’ ballot access. Peru’s combination of open list PR, moderately high district magnitude, and a fragmented party system should favor evangelicals’ ballot access as it has in Brazil, and indeed, many evangelicals have run for office. However, Peru’s evangelical community may have lacked the strategy and tactics to translate ballot access into electoral victories, in part because so many candidates have run for office, potentially spreading the evangelical vote too thin. Finally, prominent evangelical politicians in both countries have ties to disgraced former dictators—one who, in Guatemala, remained a major evangelical political leader through the 2000s. While these associations have ensured a loyal base of support in both countries, it may also have limited evangelicals’ ability to appeal more broadly.

Future research will seek to expand upon this preliminary analysis. I hope to fill in the gaps in existing knowledge of less studied countries like Chile and Guatemala; leverage additional data (including the survey experiments described above) to further assess existing explanations for evangelical success or failure; and explore additional factors, such as media access, that are only mentioned here in passing.
References


